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Individuals  with  anxiety  disorders  typically  avoid  fear-relevant  stimuli  even  if  they  miss  potential
rewards.  However,  few  studies  have accounted  for such  costs  of  fear-related  avoidance  in  doing  so.  In this
study, 51  spider  fearful  and  49  non-fearful  participants  completed  the Spider  Gambling  Task,  our  modiﬁ-
cation  of  the  Iowa  Gambling  Task,  to investigate  whether  fear-relevant  stimuli  trigger avoidant  decisions
in  the presence  of potential  rewards.  In one  version,  advantageous  choices  were  associated  with  pictures
of spiders,  whereas  the  same  pictures  were  associated  with  disadvantageous  choices  in another  ver-ecision making
ehavioral avoidance
ear
pider phobia
xperimental psychopathology
sion. Fearful  participants  generally  avoided  choices  associated  with  pictures  of  spiders,  which resulted  in
lower overall  gains  in  the version  with  advantageous  spider  decks.  Although  this  relative  avoidance  was
sustained,  fearful  participants  progressively  approach  more  advantageous  spider  choices.  These  ﬁndings
demonstrate  that  phobic  fear  results  in  irrational  avoidant  decisions  which  can  result  in  considerable
cost.  Potential  long-term  rewards  for  approach  may,  however,  diminish  absolute  avoidance  behavior.
© 2014  The  Authors.  Published  by Elsevier  Ltd.  This  is an  open  access  article  under  the  CC  BY-NC-ND. Introduction
Avoidance behavior is a diagnostic criterion of all anxiety dis-
rders and is considered to contribute to their development as
ell as maintenance (Craske et al., 2009; Lovibond, 2006). Avoid-
nce and escape are generally thought to be triggered by strong
motional responses to fear-relevant stimuli or situations, which
merge after preferential processing of these stimuli (Gerdes &
lpers, 2013; Gerdes, Pauli, & Alpers, 2009). Such responses can,
or example, be seen in heightened self-reported fear and psy-
hophysiological reactions (Alpers, Adolph, & Pauli, 2011; Lang,
reenwald, Bradley, & Hamm,  1993; Pittig, Arch, Lam, & Craske,
013). As long as avoidance is the central mode of operation
owards fear-relevant stimuli, it prevents extinction of fearful
esponses (Lovibond, Mitchell, Minard, Brady, & Menzies, 2009).
ue to avoidance behavior patients suffer substantial costs because
hey are often not able to pursue other goals and are impaired in
elevant situations (Kashdan, Elhai, & Breen, 2008).While avoidance behavior has usually been assessed through
nterviews, questionnaires, and behavioral approach tests (BATs),
esearch has recently turned to the laboratory study of more
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +49 0621 181 2106; fax: +49 0621 181 2107.
E-mail address: alpers@uni-mannheim.de (G.W. Alpers).
ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.janxdis.2014.03.001
887-6185/© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article unlicense  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).
subtle mechanisms of avoidance. For example, avoidance has been
documented to result in shorter viewing times of phobia-related
pictures (Mogg, Bradley, Miles, & Dixon, 2004; Tolin, Lohr, Lee, &
Sawchuk, 1999). With eye-tracking, it has been shown that fear-
ful individuals turn away their gaze from fear-relevant stimuli
(Pﬂugshaupt et al., 2005; Rinck & Becker, 2007). In addition, clinical
studies veriﬁed reductions of behavioral avoidance by comparing
performance in BATs before and after psychological treatments
(Williams, Kinney, & Falbo, 1989; Zoellner, Echiverri, & Craske,
2000). Such paradigms provide important insight into avoidance
responses towards discrete fear-relevant stimuli.
Adaptive behavior, however, also requires the individual to
obtain rewards or positive consequences. When anxious individ-
uals rationally think about aversive situations, even the most aver-
sive situations are explicitly recognized to foster potential personal
beneﬁts (Kashdan et al., 2008). Avoidance of discrete fear-relevant
stimuli without conﬂicting approach motivation seems rather
adaptive and may not resemble pathological avoidance in anxiety
disorders (see adaptive conservatism; Hendersen, 1985). Thus, the
fear responses and behavioral avoidance per se are only one part of a
complex conﬂict of deciding to avoid fear-relevant stimuli to reduce
fear or approach to gain potential beneﬁts. Pathological avoidance
in the framework of this approach-avoidance conﬂict is, then, char-
acterized by a dysfunctional shift towards avoidant decisions that
result in severe impairments for the individual (see also Stein &
der the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).
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aulus, 2009). At the same time, offering rewards for approach fear-
elevant stimuli may  result in diminished behavioral avoidance. A
eduction of avoidance behavior relates to common treatment goals
or anxiety disorders. Studies investigating avoidance in anxious
ndividuals should, therefore, account for both fear-relevant as well
s reward-related stimuli and consequences to better resemble the
veryday fear and anxiety and their treatment.
Well-established decision-making paradigms may  provide use-
ul tools to investigate these avoidant decisions triggered by
ear-relevant stimuli. Decision-making paradigms can combine
ear- and reward-relevant stimuli and offer explicit choices
etween approach and avoidance of the fear-relevant stimuli.
mportantly, such paradigms can account for the costs of avoidance,
easured as fewer rewards or larger losses, and potential changes
n avoidance due to the learning of such rewards and losses. Recent
ecision-making research also emphasized the interplay of cog-
itive evaluations of potential rewards and emotional processes
Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 1997; Brand, Labudda, &
arkowitsch, 2006; Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, & Welch, 2001).
n this regard, a particular well-investigated task to simulate real
ife decision making and its emotional inﬂuences is the Iowa Gam-
ling Task (IGT; Bechara, Damasio, Damasio, & Anderson, 1994;
echara, Tranel, & Damasio, 2000). The IGT has been adminis-
ered to various healthy and clinical populations (for a review see
unn, Dalgleish, & Lawrence, 2006). Brieﬂy, the IGT offers differ-
nt choices in form of four card decks, which are associated with
ifferent short- and long-term gains and losses. Decks with high
mmediate gains also yield very high occasional losses, resulting in
ong term loss, decks with small immediate gains result in long term
ain, because they only yield small occasional losses. However, the
articipant has to uncover this contingency over time. Most impor-
antly, although cognitive evaluations of rewards and losses are
rucial for advantageous decision making, choices in the IGT seem
o be inﬂuenced by an emotional bias (Bechara et al., 1997), which
s may  be stronger for initial decisions under uncertainty (Brand,
ecknor, Grabenhorst, & Bechara, 2007).
Recently, the IGT has been used to investigate the inﬂuences of
nxiety on general decision making. Findings indicate that patients
ith generalized anxiety and obsessive-compulsive disorder are
enerally impaired while deciding under uncertain conditions
Cavedini et al., 2002; Mueller, Nguyen, Ray, & Borkovec, 2010;
tarcke, Tuschen-Cafﬁer, Markowitsch, & Brand, 2009). Further-
ore, there has been no consistent pattern of results with respect
o trait anxiety. While one study found that individuals with
igher trait anxiety make more advantageous choices resulting
n long term gain (Werner, Duschek, Mattern, & Schandry, 2009),
nother one found the opposite pattern (Miu, Heilman, & Houser,
008). Avoidant decisions due to the confrontation with a fear-
elevant stimulus have not been investigated in the framework
f an approach-avoidance conﬂict. These studies, however, clearly
emonstrate the need to control for general levels of unspeciﬁc trait
nd state anxiety.
The present study investigated avoidant decision making as
 result of an approach-avoidance conﬂict. Pictures of spiders
ere added to the original IGT to speciﬁcally investigate how
he learning of advantageous choices to maximize overall gains is
nﬂuenced by speciﬁc fear-relevant stimuli. Individuals with and
ithout spider fear were recruited and invited to play this Spi-
er Gambling Task (SGT). In order to maintain the original goal
maximize gain and minimize loss) and examine the emotional
ffects of the fear-relevant stimuli at the same time, the different
timuli were absolutely task-irrelevant (see Gerdes, Alpers, & Pauli,
008). Thus, adequate rational behavior would be to only pay atten-
ion to the constant feedback of gains and losses and ignore the
ictures. Avoidance of the fear-relevant stimuli would, however,
educe advantageous choices of fearful participants, if the spiderisorders 28 (2014) 326–334 327
pictures are associated with an advantageous decision strategy.
Here, avoidant decisions would consequentially result in long-term
costs for these individuals. Following this, spider fearful partici-
pants (SFP) were expected to perform better relative to non-fearful
control participants (NFP), when spider pictures are associated with
disadvantageous choices (non-conﬂict version), but perform worse
when spider pictures are associated with the advantageous decks
(conﬂict version).
2. Materials and methods
2.1. Participants
Altogether, 100 volunteers participated in the study. Partici-
pants were recruited from the general population by advertise-
ments in local newspapers and from the student body of Bielefeld
University. They were preselected according to their scores on
the German version of the Fear of Spider Questionnaire (Rinck
et al., 2002). Following Rinck et al. (2002), participants with scores
between 0 and 6 were assigned to the NFP group, participants
with a score of 15 or higher to the SFP group (see also Materi-
als and Procedures). Due to possible effects on SGT  performance,
additional exclusion criteria for all participants were age younger
than 20 years or older than 55 years (Denburg, Tranel, & Bechara,
2005); any neurological or other current severe medical condition
or organic/traumatic brain damage, and current use of psychoac-
tive medication. All participants volunteered to participate and
provided written informed consent prior to the experiment. Par-
ticipants were randomly assigned to one of the two SGT versions
with respect to balanced gender ratio within groups.
Descriptive data of the four experimental groups (2 fear
groups × 2 SGT versions) are shown in Table 1. Statistical analysis
(one way  ANOVAs, Kruskal–Wallis H tests and a 2 test for gen-
der ratio) showed signiﬁcant differences between the experimental
groups only for fear of spiders (FSQ). Post-hoc Mann–Whitney U
tests (Bonferroni corrected) indicated signiﬁcant higher fear of spi-
ders scores for both fearful groups compared to each non-fearful
group, Us < 0.001, zs = −6.22 to −6.04, ps < .001. No signiﬁcant dif-
ferences were found between fearful groups, U = 237.5, z = −1.65,
p = .099, or between non-fearful groups, U = 230.5, z = −1.53,
p = .127. For fear of spiders, previous clinical samples with diag-
nosed spider phobia (DSM-IV; American Psychiatric Association,
2000) exhibited average FSQ scores from 20 (Gerdes et al., 2008;
Pﬂugshaupt et al., 2007) up to 90 (Alpers et al., 2009; Muris &
Merckelbach, 1996; Rinck & Becker, 2006; Teachman & Woody,
2003). Thus, the average level of fear in the present analogue sample
of highly fearful participants (M = 65.98, SD = 25.69) was compara-
ble to the level of clinically diagnosed patients with spider phobia
and even slightly higher than the normative patient group (M = 58.7,
Rinck et al., 2002). In addition, the average level of fear was  much
higher than in patients with spider phobia after exposure treatment
(Muris & Merckelbach, 1996; Teachman & Woody, 2003). No sig-
niﬁcant group differences were found for the other demographic,
clinical, and neuropsychological variables, i.e. groups were not dif-
ferent in terms of age, gender ration, education, state and trait
anxiety, reasoning, risky decision making, or executive functioning.
2.2. Materials and procedure
A screening for eligibility included questions about sociodemo-
graphic data, exclusion criteria, and the German version of the Fear
of Spiders Questionnaire (FSQ; Szymanski & O’Donohue, 1995; Ger-
man  version: Rinck et al., 2002). The FSQ is a widely used self-report
questionnaire and assesses fear of spiders with 18 items (7-point
Likert scale; 0 = Not at all to 6 = Absolutely). For analyses, a sum score
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Table 1
Descriptive data of the spider-fearful and the non-fearful groups.
SFP non-conﬂict (n = 26) SFP conﬂict (n = 25) NFP non-conﬂict (n = 24) NFP conﬂict (n = 25) 2 or F p
Female/male 20/6 20/5 19/5 17/8 1.24d .743
Age  34.85 (11.17) 31.68 (8.01) 31.75 (11.30) 31.08 (10.80) 1.80d .616
Education in years 11.8 (1.32) 11.72 (1.54) 12.42 (1.25) 12.16 (1.46) 5.93d .115
Fear  of Spiders (FSQ) 60.81 (24.36) 71.36 (26.42) 1.67 (2.01) .84 (1.46) 76.97d <.001
State  Anxiety (STAI-S) 40.52a (9.45) 38.30 (9.71) 35.60 (10.76) 34.80 (6.28) 5.94d .115
Trait  Anxiety (STAI-T) 41.82 (9.71) 42.00 (9.35) 39.42 (8.73) 37.44 (7.33) 1.51e .216
IQ  (based on LPS-4) 114.42 (10.93) 116.76 (10.30) 116.92 (13.95) 119.36 (10.08) 0.80e .497
Risky  decision making (GDT) 9.38 (6.66) 9.52 (6.59) 7.00 (9.60) 9.52 (7.05) 0.37d .946
MCST: correct 36.50 (11.42) 41.76 (4.93) 40.71 (9.46) 41.92 (6.79) 6.10d .107
MCST: categoriesb 45.12a (11.06) 51.00 (4.30) 49.13c (6.55) 48.76 (7.31) 2.82d .420
MCST: non-perseverative errorsb 43.23 (12.80) 48.64 (4.31) 47.29 (11.63) 48.12 (8.78) 3.37d .337
MCST: perseverative errorsb 50.35 (7.09) 53.24 (4.88) 51.67 (3.97) 52.92 (2.48) 6.20d .102
Note. Means (and standard deviations) for groups (SFP = spider fearful participants. NFP = non fearful participants) and experimental conditions (non-conﬂict = SGT version with
disadvantageous spider decks; Conﬂict = SGT version with advantageous spider decks). n = Number of participants; FSQ = German version of the Fear of Spider Questionnaire
(Rinck et al., 2002); STAI-S and STAI-T = German version of the State-Trait Anxiety (Laux et al., 1981); LPS = Leistungsprüfsystem [Performance Test System] (Horn, 1983);
GDT  = Game of Dice task (Brand et al., 2005); MCST = Modiﬁed Card Sorting Test (Nelson, 1976).
a n = 25, due to one missing value.
b Raw data are transformed into T-scores (Lineweaver, Bond, Thomas, & Salmon, 1999).
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f all 18 items is calculated (range: 0–108). The German version
as very good internal consistency (Cronbach’s  ˛ = .96–.97), very
igh test–retest reliability (r = .95), and solid construct validity – as
emonstrated with other measures of fear of spiders (r = .73–.90;
inck et al., 2002). Most importantly, various studies showed signif-
cant differences in FSQ scores in fearful compared to non-fearful
ndividuals (e.g., Alpers et al., 2009; Gerdes et al., 2008; Rinck &
ecker, 2006, 2007; Rinck et al., 2002), with non-overlapping sum
core distributions between spider fearful participants (above 15)
nd non-fearful controls (between 0 and 6; Rinck et al., 2002).
After participants gave written informed consent at the begin-
ing of the experimental session, general state and trait anxiety
ere assessed with the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI;
pielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, & Vagg, 1983; German version:
aux, Glanzmann, Schaffner, & Spielberger, 1981). The 20-item
tate and trait versions of the STAI show sound psychometric
roperties, including strong internal consistency, test-retest reli-
bility, and convergent validity (Laux et al., 1981). Following the
uestionnaires, participants completed the SGT and additional
europsychological control measures. After completing all tasks
articipants were debriefed and received detailed information
bout spider phobia, its treatment (including local treatment possi-
ilities) and access to an online self-help program for spider phobia
SpiderNet; Baumann, Alpers & Pauli, 2007).
.2.1. Spider gambling task (SGT)
Unless otherwise speciﬁed, design and procedure of the com-
uterized Spider Gambling Task (SGT) followed the original version
f the computerized IGT (Bechara et al., 1994, 2000). The IGT com-
rises four decks of cards (A, B, C and D with 40 cards each) from
hich participants are supposed to select one card in each of 100
rials. After each selection participants win a speciﬁc amount of ﬁc-
itious money, but occasionally also lose another speciﬁc amount
ith the same selection. Overall, decks A and B yield high immedi-
te gains, but even higher occasional losses. Therefore, both decks
re considered as disadvantageous, because they result in long-
erm losses. Contrary, decks C and D yield small immediate gains,
ut also small occasional losses and are considered as advanta-
eous, because they result in long-term gains. Participants are
nstructed to freely switch between the four decks in order to max-
mize their monetary gains. At the beginning they are not aware of
he rules for gains and losses or the duration of the task. Thus, theyhave to use continuous feedback of gains and losses to learn which
decks are advantageous or disadvantageous.
Fig. 1 shows two screenshots of the two  modiﬁed SGT versions.
Amount of starting capital (2000), gains and losses were the same
as in the IGT. Account balance was displayed by two colored bars
(a green bar indicates a positive balance, a red bar a negative bal-
ance). To investigate avoidant decisions in individuals with fear
of spiders, we implemented three major modiﬁcations. First, card
backs were replaced by pictures of two  spiders and two  butterﬂies
(approximately 9.15© × 5.73© visual angle). Pictures were taken
from Gerdes, Uhl, and Alpers (2009), who found higher ratings on
fear, disgust and danger for both spiders (Ctenus spider and Evarcha
arcuata) compared to both butterﬂies (Lycaena phlaeas and Papilio
machaon), especially in SFP. The two  SGT versions only differed in
the positions of the pictures. In one version, spiders were depicted
on the disadvantageous decks A and B and butterﬂies on the advan-
tageous decks C and D. This version is referred to as the non-conﬂict
version, because avoidance does not conﬂict with long-term gains.
In the other version picture position was vice versa. In this conﬂict
version, choosing to avoid the fear-relevant stimuli is in conﬂict
with long-term gains. Second, the mouse sensitive area for select-
ing a deck was  reduced to a small square in the middle of each deck
(approximately 0.57© visual angle). Thus, selecting a deck required
a ﬁxation on the middle of the deck, forcing participants to actually
look at the corresponding picture. Third, instead of turning black
after each card selection a transparent gray shading of the decks
was used to visualize this selection. This transparency ensures that
the spiders and butterﬂies are still visible. Therefore card selec-
tion could not be used as avoidance strategy (i.e. the pictures never
disappeared completely).
2.2.2. Additional neuropsychological measures
Risky decisions: Game of dice task (GDT). The GDT is a comput-
erized dice task to measure risky decision making (Brand et al.,
2005). In 18 trials a virtual die is thrown and participants are
supposed to maximize a ﬁctitious starting capital by guessing
the correct number thrown. Participants can choose between safe
guesses with lower gains (i.e. a combination of 3 (50% probability to
win 200 D) or 4 numbers (66.67% probability to win 100 D)) or risky
guesses (a single number (16.67% probability to win 1000 D) or a
combination of 2 numbers (33.33% probability to win  500 D)). For
analysis, a net score is calculated by subtracting the number of risky
choices from the number of safe choices. Thus, a higher net score
A. Pittig et al. / Journal of Anxiety Disorders 28 (2014) 326–334 329
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Means and standard deviations of the number of advantageous
choices for the four experimental groups across blocks yielded suf-
ﬁcient variance for regression analyses (Fig. 1). In addition, theig. 1. Screenshot of both modiﬁed SGT versions. Left: Non-Conﬂict version of S
dvantageous spider decks (C and D). “Gewinn” = Gain,” Verlust” = Loss; “Bitte Karte
ndicates more safe choices. Each choice is associated with stable
nd explicit gains and losses, with more risky choices associated
ith higher potential gains/losses. For the GDT, the number of risky
ecisions can be used as dependent variable. In contrast to the SGT,
he GDT does not involve fear-relevant stimuli and participants can
asily calculate winning probabilities and the amount of risk asso-
iated with the different choices. The GDT was, thus, administered
o ensure that possible group differences in SGT performance are
ot a result of a general difference in risky decision making.
Executive functions: Modiﬁed card sorting test (MCST). The
CST (Nelson, 1976) is a computerized card sorting task with con-
tantly changing rules of how the cards are supposed to be sorted.
t is a test of cognitive ﬂexibility, because participants frequently
ave to adjust their sorting strategy to the changing rules and, thus,
easures individual differences in executive functioning such as
ategorization, set-shifting, the tendency to perseverate, and the
bility to use feedback. In a normative study (N > 200), Lineweaver,
ond, Thomas, and Salmon (1999) developed demographically cor-
ected norms for various dependent variables of the MCST, such as
he number of correctly completed categories (0–6), the percent-
ge of correctly sorted cards, and the number of incorrect responses
split into perseverative and non-perseverative errors). To facilitate
omparisons and clinical interpretations the raw data are converted
nto standard T-scores (M = 50, SD = 10). The assessed executive
unctions may  inﬂuence decision making in the original IGT (Brand
t al., 2007). Therefore, the computerized MCST was  used to con-
rol for initial group differences in executive functions and potential
nﬂuences on SGT performance.
Logical reasoning: Performance test system–Subtest 4 (LPS-4).
easoning abilities might inﬂuence the decision-making process
uring IGT performance (Bechara et al., 1997). Therefore, differ-
nces in reasoning were controlled with the LPS-4 (Horn, 1983).The
PS-4 is a non-verbal reasoning test. In a total of 40 rows, par-
icipants are instructed to ﬁnd an error in a logical order of
etters and number. Main dependent variable is the number of cor-
ectly identiﬁed errors within 8 min. To facilitate comparison and
nterpretation, the number of correct responses is converted into
tandard IQ scores (M = 100, SD = 15) following a comparison with
ge- and gender-corrected norms (Horn, 1983).
.3. Statistical analysis
Analogous to IGT analyses (Bechara et al., 2000), the 100 tri-
ls of the SGT were subdivided into ﬁve blocks of 20 trials each.
ain dependent variables were the number of advantageous
hoices. Depending on the SGT version, more frequent advan-
ageous choices indicated either less frequent choices from the
ecks depicting spiders (within the non-conﬂict version) or moreith disadvantageous spider decks (A and B). Right: Conﬂict version of SGT with
ählen” = Please select a card.
frequent choices from the spider decks (within the conﬂict version).
The SGT was  modeled closely on the original IGT, thus, each deck
consisted of 40 single cards, i.e. a total of 80 cards from a butterﬂy
deck (2 × 40 cards) could be chosen in the 100 trials. Later obser-
vations yielded that some fearful participants depleted all possible
cards from the non-spiders decks before the end of the game and
only then were forced to turn to the remaining cards in the spider
decks. Because this would result in an artiﬁcial inﬂuence on deci-
sion making after 80 selections, all further analyses were restricted
to the ﬁrst four blocks.1
Hierarchical linear growth curve models (HLMs) were built
with the number of advantageous choices as the dependent vari-
able to model repeated decisions within SGT blocks (Level-1)
nested in different individuals (Level-2) using HLM 6.08 software
(Raudenbush, Bryk, Cheong, & Congdon, 2004; Raudenbush & Bryk,
2002). Examination of the raw data resulted in the use of linear
level-1 components to model the number of advantageous choices
(i.e., changes across blocks were modeled in a linear way). There-
fore, SGT blocks (Block 1–4) were entered as the repeated level-1
predictor. In order to investigate if fear of spiders alters decisions
differentially within the SGT versions, Fear of Spiders (NFP vs. SFP),
SGT version (conﬂict vs. non-conﬂict), and the interaction term of
both factors (Fear of Spiders × SGT version) were entered as main
predictor on level-2. This main model was  built to test if these vari-
ables predicted the number of advantageous choices for the ﬁrst
block (intercept) and linear change across blocks (slope). In addi-
tion, the different clinical and neuropsychological variables (trait
anxiety, risky decisions, reasoning, and executive functioning) as
well as age and gender were entered on level-2 to test and con-
trol potential inﬂuences on decision making. Before entering these
additional variables into the main model, each predictor was sep-
arately tested on level-2 to ensure that a potential effect was not
covered by the effect of another variable or poor statistical power.
Afterwards, signiﬁcant predictors were combined in one model to
test for incremental predictive effects.
3. Results
3.1. Impact of fear on decision making1 Detailed exploratory analyses revealed that this depletion of non-spider cards
was  observed in four participants (two within each version of the SGT). Excluding
them from all further analysis did not signiﬁcantly alter the main results nor did the
pattern of results change if Block 5 was included for the remaining participants.
330 A. Pittig et al. / Journal of Anxiety Disorders 28 (2014) 326–334
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wig. 2. (A) Mean number of advantageous choices across blocks in the non-conﬂic
ecks); (B) mean number of advantageous choices across blocks in the conﬂict vers
alues  above 10 indicate that advantageous decks were chosen more frequently tha
umber of selections from the spider decks across blocks is shown
n Table 2 in order to facilitate a direct comparison of avoidant
ecisions between the experimental groups.
.1.1. Initial decisions
As expected, the interaction of Fear of Spiders and SGT ver-
ion signiﬁcantly predicted initial decisions in Block 1 of the
GT (intercept), Fear of Spiders × SGT Version, B = 6.81, SE = 1.29,
(96) = 5.28, p < .001. Fear of Spiders or SGT versions, however,
ielded no main effect on initial decisions in Block 1, Fear of Spi-
ers, B = 0.19, SE = 0.64, t(96) = 0.29, p = .770; SGT Version, B = 0.65,
E = 0.65, t (96) = 1.01, p = .314. Post hoc t-tests for the number of
dvantageous choices in Block 1 (Bonferroni corrected) indicated
igniﬁcantly more advantageous choices for SFP in the non-conﬂict
ersion (M = 10.27, SD = 5.53) compared to SFP in the conﬂict ver-
ion (M = 5.44, SD = 3.28), t(49) = 2.72, p = .009, and compared to
FP in the non-conﬂict version (M = 6.67, SD = 1.76), t(48) = 2.54,
 = .014. NFP in the conﬂict version initially also showed signiﬁ-
antly more advantageous choices (M = 9.28, SD = 2.78) compared
o SFP in the conﬂict version, t(35) = 4.70, p < .001. Furthermore,
here was a non-signiﬁcant trend that NFP in the conﬂict version
howed more advantageous choices at the beginning than NFP in
he non-conﬂict version, t(47) = 5.52, p < .001. No signiﬁcant dif-
erences were found between SFP in the non-conﬂict version and
FP in the conﬂict version, t(33.88) = −0.87, p = .389, and between
FP in the conﬂict version and NFP in the non-conﬂict version,
(41.32) = −0.60, p = .554. In sum, these results indicate that SFP
voided the spider decks in both versions, whereas NFP tended to
elect these decks more frequently in both versions. Thus, SFP in the
on-conﬂict version and NFP in the conﬂict version showed more
dvantageous decisions at the beginning, which opposed the more
requent disadvantageous decisions of SFP in the conﬂict version
nd NFP in the non-conﬂict version.
.1.2. Learning of advantageous decisions
Generally, all participants learned to make more advantageous
hoices across the task as indicated by a signiﬁcantly positive
able 2
ean number of spider deck selections across the gambling task.
Block 1 Block 2 
Conﬂict version
SFP 5.44 (3.28) 8.92 (4.46) 
NFP  9.28 (2.77) 11.36 (2.98) 
Non-conﬂict version
SFP 9.73 (5.53) 8.88 (4.69) 
NFP  13.33 (1.76) 11.63 (2.98) 
ote. Means (and standard deviations) for groups (SFP = Spider fearful participants. NFP =
ith  disadvantageous spider decks; Conﬂict = SGT version with advantageous spider deckion of the spider gambling task (i.e., spiders were located on the disadvantageous
 the spider gambling task (i.e., spiders were located on the disadvantageous decks).
dvantageous decks. SFP = spider fearful participants; NFP = non-fearful participants.
slope, B = 1.04, SE = 0.13, t(96) = 8.03, p < .001. Across SGT versions,
SFP showed signiﬁcantly less increase in advantageous decisions
compared to NFP, main effect Fear of Spiders, B = −0.59, SE = 0.26,
t(96) = −2.27, p = .026. In addition, all participant in the in the
non-conﬂict version with disadvantageous spider decks showed
less increase in advantageous decisions, main effect SGT version,
B = −0.53, SE = 0.26, t(96) = −2.05, p = .043. However, the interaction
of Fear of Spiders and SGT version did not signiﬁcantly pre-
dicted learning of advantageous choices across the SGT, Fear of
Spiders × SGT Version, B = −0.10, SE = 0.52, t(96) = −0.20, p = .844
(Fig. 2).
Because SFP avoided the spider decks in Block 1, they had less
experience with the contingencies of the speciﬁc spider decks in the
ﬁrst block. This may  have inﬂuenced subsequent learning during
the task. To control for this pre-existing bias, the number of advan-
tageous choices in Block 1 was  entered on level-2 of the HLM to test
if initial decisions predicted learning of advantageous choices and
solely accounted for the signiﬁcant effects of Fear of Spiders and SGT
version. Results indicated that participant with less advantageous
choices during the initial block showed increased learning across
the SGT (steeper slope), B = −0.11, SE = 0.03, t(95) = −3.86, p < .001.
Due to the inclusion of the number of advantageous choices the
main effect of SGT version on learning in the SGT was not signiﬁ-
cant anymore, B = −0.40, SE = 0.24, t(95) = −1.66, p = .101. However,
the main effect of Fear of Spiders remained signiﬁcant, B = −0.60,
SE = 0.24, t(95) = −2.49, p = .015. Thus, even if controlled for initial
experience in the SGT, SFP showed signiﬁcantly less increase in
advantageous decisions compared to NFP across both SGT versions.
3.1.3. Costs of avoidant decisions
To illustrate that avoidant decisions were indeed linked to dif-
ferences in overall gain, a univariate ANOVA with ﬁnal balance
as dependent measure with Fear of Spiders and SGT version as
between factors was  calculated (see Fig. 3). Results yielded no main
effect of Fear of Spiders, F(1, 96) = 0.41, p = .522, partial 2 = .004,
or SGT version, F(1, 96) = 0.35, p = .556, partial 2 = .004. There
Block 3 Block 4 Total
8.16 (4.84) 9.16 (5.23) 31.68 (15.34)
13.20 (3.16) 13.92 (3.38) 47.76 (7.76)
8.69 (5.14) 8.27 (4.87) 35.58 (17.93)
11.42 (3.66) 9.75 (3.93) 46.12 (9.94)
 Non fearful participants) and experimental conditions (Non-Conﬂict = SGT version
s).
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Fig. 3. Mean overall gains for groups (SFP = spider fearful participants. NFP = non
fearful participants) and experimental conditions (non-conﬂict = SGT version with
disadvantageous spider decks; conﬂict = SGT version with advantageous spider
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development of such responses may  have been especially biased byecks).
as, however, a signiﬁcant interaction between the two  factors,
(1, 96) = 23.27, p < .001, partial 2 = .195. Post hoc t-tests (Bon-
erroni corrected) indicated a signiﬁcant higher overall gain for
FP in the non-conﬂict version (M = 1550.38, SD = 1544.38) com-
ared to SFP in the conﬂict version (M = 529.20, SD = 1185.86),
(49) = 2.64, p = .011, and compared to NFP in the non-conﬂict
ersion (M = 541.88, SD = 961.84), t(48) = 2.79, p = .008. NFP in the
onﬂict version (M = 1848.00, SD = 1018.35) also showed a signif-
cant higher overall gain compared to SFP in the conﬂict version,
(48) = 4.22, p < .001, and compared to NFP in the non-conﬂict ver-
ion, t(47) = 4.62, p < .001. No signiﬁcant differences were found
etween SFP in the non-conﬂict version and NFP in the conﬂict
ersion, t(49) = −0.81, p = .422, and between SFP in the conﬂict
ersion and NFP in the non-conﬂict version, t(47) = 0.97, p = .967.
hus, avoidant decisions of the SFP resulted in higher overall gain
hen spiders were associated with disadvantageous choices. When
piders were, however, associated with advantageous choices,
voidant decisions of the SFP resulted in long-term costs.
.2. Impact of control variables on decision making
Better executive functioning as indexed by a higher number
f correct categorizations in the MCST (MCST: correct; Table 1)
redicted increased learning of advantageous choices across the
hole sample (slope), B = 0.02, SE = 0.01, t(98) = 2.50, p = .014, but
ad no effect on initial decisions in Block 1 (intercept), B = −0.03,
E = 0.04, t(98) = −0.78, p = .439. After adding the number of correct
ategorizations to the model including Fear of Spiders and SGT ver-
ion, correct categorizations had no incremental effect on learning
dvantageous decisions, B = 0.01, SE = 0.02, t(95) = 1.91, p = .059, and
id not change any of the signiﬁcant effects described above.
The effects on intercept and slope were not signiﬁcant for the
emaining control variables: (1) Age: Intercept: B = −0.01, SE = 0.04,
(98) = −0.29, p = .775, Slope: B = −0.02, SE = 0.01, t(98) = −1.84,
 = .069; (2) Gender: Intercept: B = −1.07, SE = 0.92, t(98) = −1.16,
 = .249, Slope: B = −0.36, SE = 0.33, t(98) = −1.09, p = .279; (3) Trait
nxiety: Intercept: B = −0.07, SE = 0.05, t(98) = −1.55, p = .123, Slope:
 < 0.01, SE = 0.01, t(98) = 0.19, p = .847; (4) Risky decisions mak-
ng (GDT): Intercept: B = 0.05, SE = 0.04, t(98) = 1.45, p = .150, Slope:
 < 0.01, SE = 0.02, t(98) = 0.30, p = .764; (5) Reasoning (LPS-4):
ntercept: B = 0.02, SE = 0.03, t(98) = 0.69, p = .490, Slope: B = 0.02,
E = 0.01, t(98) = 1.69, p = .094. In sum, the effects Fear of Spiders and
GT version could not be explained by one of the control variables.isorders 28 (2014) 326–334 331
4. Discussion
The present study established a modiﬁcation of a well-known
decision-making task, the Iowa Gambling Task (Bechara et al.,
2000), as a novel approach to account for potential rewards in the
investigation of avoidance behavior in spider fearful individuals.
In the SGT, these rewards are incorporated in a basic experimental
design by the different short and long term gains and losses. Results
showed avoidant decisions of the fear-relevant stimuli in spider
fearful participants compared to non-fearful participants, even in
the presence of long-term costs due to these decisions.
Speciﬁcally, fearful participants showed avoidant decisions at
the beginning of the gambling task when reward contingencies
were uncertain. These ﬁndings are in line with ﬁndings that fearful
individuals show initial behavioral avoidance when being con-
fronted with fear-relevant stimuli (Pittig, Schulz, Craske, & Alpers,
2014; Rinck & Becker, 2007; Tolin et al., 1999). Fearful partici-
pants avoided the spider pictures in both versions of the task,
although these stimuli were completely irrelevant for the overall
goal of the task (maximize overall gain). Furthermore, comparing
the two versions, fearful participants showed opposite alterations
in decisions due to the opposite locations of the spiders. Interest-
ingly, the spider stimuli also tended to inﬂuence decisions of the
non-fearful participants. In contrast to the fearful participants, non-
fearful participants seemed to prefer the spider decks. Although this
preference is difﬁcult to explain, it may  have resulted from an atten-
tional capture or greater salience of the spiders. In addition, these
ﬁndings were independent of age, gender, logical reasoning, execu-
tive functioning, and general risky decision making. Taken together,
initial avoidant decisions of the SFP were caused by the fear-
relevant stimuli and no other task-speciﬁc features (e.g., favoring
speciﬁc decks because of their location or speciﬁc contingencies)
or participants’ characteristics.
Findings further indicated that fearful participants showed
impairments in the learning of advantageous choices across both
versions of the gambling task. Even if controlled for different ini-
tial experience due to initial avoidance, fearful participants showed
less increase in advantageous choices than non-fearful partici-
pants. There may  be a number of explanations for this speciﬁc
learning deﬁcit. First, fearful individuals show selective attention
towards fear-relevant stimuli (Alpers et al., 2009; Gerdes et al.,
2008; Rinck & Becker, 2006). In terms of an attentional shift, this
attentional bias towards fear-relevant stimuli may  have resulted in
less attention towards reward feedback, which in turn may have
resulted in impaired learning of an advantageous strategy. Sec-
ond, past research provided numerous ﬁndings for elevated stress
responses of fearful individuals during the confrontation with
fear-relevant stimuli. For example, pronounced stress responses
in fearful individuals have been shown in elevated cortisol, heart
rate and skin conductance responses (Alpers, Wilhelm, & Roth,
2005; Bublatzky, Flaisch, Stockburger, Schmälzle, & Schupp, 2010;
Fredrikson, Sundin, & Frankenhaeuser, 1985; Pittig et al., 2014).
Such stress responses can result in general decision-making impair-
ments (Starcke & Brand, 2012; van den Bos, Harteveld, & Stoop,
2009), which may  have in turn impaired learning of the fear-
ful participants in the present study. Finally, recent theories have
also stressed the importance of speciﬁc emotional responses for
advantageous decision making (Bechara et al., 1997; Loewenstein
et al., 2001). In the Iowa Gambling Task, anticipatory emotional
responses towards the disadvantageous decks have been associ-
ated with unimpaired performance (Bechara et al., 1997; Bechara,
Tranel, Damasio, & Damasio, 1996). In our modiﬁed version, thethe fear-relevant stimuli within fearful participants and, therefore,
generally impaired decision making in the SGT. Again, the lean-
ing deﬁcits were independent of age, gender, logical reasoning,
3 iety D
e
a
r
r
r
d
I
i
i
l
a
l
a
a
a
i
I
a
c
p
b
s
e
t
b
t
f
t
e
i
u
r
a
w
p
p
l
r
i
l
c
a
(
t
r
f
n
f
c
1
d
e
i
n
g
F
d
w
a
T
a
i
b
232 A. Pittig et al. / Journal of Anx
xecutive functioning, and general risky decision making. Thus,
lthough the underlying mechanisms cannot be completely
esolved, the present ﬁndings indicate that the presence of fear-
elevant stimuli may  result in impaired learning of long-term
ewards.
In terms of overall gains, avoidance and learning deﬁcits had
ifferent effects on task performance for the fearful participants.
n this regard, avoidance improved outcomes (higher overall gain),
f spider pictures were located on the disadvantageous decks, but
mpaired outcomes (lower overall gain), if spider pictures were
ocated on the advantageous decks. The sustained relative avoid-
nce of fearful participants in the conﬂict version, thus, resulted in
ong-term costs or the loss of rewards. Similar sustained avoidance
nd resulting costs in decision outcomes gave also been found after
versive fear conditioning (Pittig et al., 2014). These costly effects of
voidance may  be seen as a laboratory analogue of the impairments
ndividuals with severe fear and anxiety disorders incur in daily life.
n anxiety disorders, pathological levels of avoidance are recurrent
nd persistent and impair the individual in social, leisure, and work
ontexts (Hofmann, Alpers, & Pauli, 2009). In severe spider phobia,
atients are often impaired in routine activities, because they avoid
asements, attics, or traveling to certain countries. While a lot of
pider phobic patients tend to accept these costs, the potential ben-
ﬁts associated with approach are often the vital motivation to seek
reatment. In other anxiety disorder, patients have been shown to
e aware of the potential beneﬁts (that they miss out on), even for
heir most feared situations (Kashdan et al., 2008). In social anxiety,
or example, anxious individuals avoid job interviews or presenta-
ions although they are aware of the potential this may  have to
nhance their career. Laboratory analogues (such as the paradigm
ntroduced here) may, thus, contribute to our understanding of the
nderlying mechanisms of approach-avoidance conﬂicts and their
elated impairments in anxiety disorders.
Despite the relative avoidance, all participants showed an over-
ll increase in advantageous choices across the gambling task. Even
hen spiders were located on the advantageous decks, fearful
articipants showed more advantageous choices during latter com-
ared to initial decisions. While fearful participants still choose
ess advantageous than non-fearful participants, this indicates a
eduction of absolute avoidant decisions for fearful participants
n the conﬂict version. Thus, associating fear-relevant stimuli with
ong-term rewards may  slowly foster an approach motivation. This
hange relates to common therapeutic interventions for fear and
nxiety, which seek to diminish pathological avoidance behavior
see Barlow & Craske, 1994). The increase of active approach (i.e.,
he reduction of behavioral avoidance) may  be associated with a
eduction of fear by means of exposure after repeated selection
rom the spider decks. One may  also argue that these ﬁndings con-
ect to research on counter-conditioning, which provided evidence
or enhanced fear reduction when a fear-relevant stimulus is asso-
iated with positive consequences (Brooks, Hale, Nelson, & Bouton,
995; Goldstein, 1969). However, counter-conditioning results to
ate are mainly restricted to passive reward as an addition during
xtinction, during which no choice for avoidance or active approach
s offered. Another explanation may  be that avoidance, but not
ecessarily fear, decreased due to the opposing motivation to
ain long-term rewards after reward contingencies were learned.
ollowing this reasoning, reward motivation represents another
etermining factor for the strength of avoidance apart from fear,
hich may  be linked to a previously reported de-synchrony of fear
nd avoidance (Craske & Barlow, 1988; Rachman & Hodgson, 1974).
his interpretation is in line with treatment strategies which target
lternative sources of rewards to compete with the fear reduction
nherent in avoidance. One example for such a strategy is the com-
ination of exposure with positive operant reinforcement (Alpers,
010). Another example for this alternative focus may  be theisorders 28 (2014) 326–334
highlighting of life goals and values in Acceptance-Commitment
therapy (Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson, 2003; Yovel & Bigman, 2012).
Finally, it seems likely that both described mechanisms affected
behavior in the same direction; approaching long-term rewards
would also facilitate exposure to the fear-relevant stimuli in the
conﬂict version in our paradigm. Thus, although it is difﬁcult to
dismantle the speciﬁc role of rewards and fear reduction in the
present study, results indicated an extinction of absolute avoidant
decisions over time. Further investigating the effects of rewards
within a decision conﬂict between approach and avoidance of fear-
relevant stimuli may, therefore, may  expand past research and be
more closely related to pathological avoidance behavior in anxiety
disorders and its treatment.
4.1. Future directions and conclusion
In the present study, various measures were included in order
to control for individual differences in risky decision-making, rea-
soning, and executive functioning. Still, future research may  also
investigate further clinical and neuropsychological predictors of
performance in avoidant decision-making paradigms in fearful and
non-fearful individuals. For example, impulsivity seems to be asso-
ciated with impaired performance in the IGT (Franken, van Strien,
Nijs, & Muris, 2008), although mixed results have been reported
(Franken & Muris, 2005; Perales, Verdejo-Garcia, Moya, Lozano, &
Perez-Garcia, 2009). This association has also been found in patients
with Borderline personality disorder (Haaland & Landrø, 2007).
In addition, the number of female and male participants was
not balanced with the experimental groups of the present study
(despite similar distribution between groups). The study was  not
designed to test the impact of gender on avoidant decisions. The
distribution in our sample corresponds with the higher prevalence
of anxiety disorders, especially for animal fears, in women (Craske,
2003). Thus, gender distribution within a naturalistic fearful sample
may be expected to be unbalanced. Still, gender-related differences
in behavioral avoidance have been suggested (McLean & Anderson,
2009). Therefore, future research should recruit equally balanced
groups and directly test potential differences in avoidant decisions
in women and men.
Decision-making theories and paradigms may  be a fruitful
approach to combine different areas of research on anxiety and
pathological avoidance (e.g., research on cognitive biases or fear
conditioning). Future studies should, therefore, replicate the effect
of fear on avoidant decisions and speciﬁcally address the role
of fear-related cognitive and emotional responses during these
avoidant decision-making processes. Future research should also
investigate the predictive power of avoidant decisions for the actual
daily life and treatment outcomes in clinical anxiety. Cognitive and
behavioral treatments aim to build or strengthen processes and
information that result in engaging and approach of beneﬁcial and
desired situations, as well as correcting processes and information
that lead to avoidance. If potential rewards can diminish avoidant
decisions, performance in our experimental context may  even have
predictive value for therapy outcome or relapse. Taken together,
this novel paradigm provided evidence for costly avoidant deci-
sion in fearful participant, which may  be diminished by potential
rewards.
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